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Abstract 
Market liberalisation has fundamentally changed state interventions in the supply 
of services and supportive infrastructure across a range of public services. While 
this trend has been relatively well documented, there has been a dearth of research 
into the changing nature of state interventions in migration and mobility. Indeed 
the increasing presence of migration intermediaries to service the many and varied 
needs of migrant workers, particularly skilled migrants, remains significantly 
under-researched both theoretically and empirically. In providing an analysis of 
the location, role and changing nature of migration intermediaries, we highlight 
the implications of commercially-driven governance structures. In particular we 
suggest that the shift from government to network governance has important 
implications for skilled migration including: inequities in access to information 
regarding the process of migration and labour market integration; and, greater 
dependence on (largely unregulated) private intermediaries. Accordingly, we 
present empirical examples of migration intermediaries to illustrate their role and 
the relationship with and implications of their exchange with migrants.  
 
Keywords: Network governance, Intermediaries, Skilled migration, 
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Introduction: Defining Migration Intermediaries  
Set against a backdrop of market liberalisation, a ‘hollowing out’ and de-centering of 
state mobilised services, support, and infrastructure has developed since the late 
1980s (Fauser, 2014; Geddes et al 2012a, 2012b). The shift from government to 
network governance has been described as a shift from ‘command-and-control’ to 
‘arms length’ management of state services by government agencies (Hysing 2009). 
This devolution of services to private agents in a variety of different publicly 
administered areas signals a transfer of authority and decision-making power from 
state-owned and managed institutional arrangements, to market-based interests (see 
for instance Bevir 2010; Rhodes 1997). Rhodes (1997, 109) argues that the shift to 
network governance means there is: “no one centre but multiple centres; there is no 
sovereign authority because networks have considerable autonomy.”  
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While studies of migrant mobility have often focused on explanations of why 
individuals and/or families migrate (de Haas 2010; Straubhaar 2000), the agents who 
procure migrant workers and mediate and facilitate the process of migration are 
portrayed as little more than ‘passive’ or ‘neutral’ players. Furthermore, the 
differentiation between migrant channels (Findlay and Li, 1998) and the commercial 
exchange that has intensified between the migrant and the various agents has also 
been largely neglected (Krissman 2005; Salt and Stein 1997; Sporton 2013). 
When compared to the decades following the post World War II period, the migration 
process is now far more responsive to market (demand) conditions (Favell and 
Hanson 2002). This trend has consolidated non-state agencies as principal  managing 
agent of the migration of international labour, particularly throughout the OECD 
(OECD 2011, 2012). For example, the changing context of migration has resulted in 
the proliferation of a suite of non-state bodies and commercially-driven agents 
including: recruitment and migration agents, employers and managers, independent 
contractors and educational institutions, to name a few (Elrick and Lewandowska 
2008; Pijpers 2010).  
The dominant pattern of migration is now directly shaped by national markets 
demanding ready, accessible, skilled and flexible labour which is being sourced 
outside national boundaries (OECD 2011, 2012). Relatedly, feeding into this 
transition to market-driven migration has been the pool of available, educated, mobile 
and skilled stocks of labour (Harvey and Groutsis 2012).  
While there is an extensive scholarship examining the ‘illegitimate’ side of migration 
intermediaries, such as traffickers of irregular migrants and refugees (Fernandez 
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2013; Leman and Janssens 2007; Salt and Stein, 1997; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 
2012), to date, little is known about the various agents servicing the needs of skilled 
migrants. There is also, at best, a partial understanding of why and how they have 
emerged and the implications of the relations forged between intermediaries and 
skilled migrants. Addressing this oversight is important given the market orientation 
of international migration, and the rise of new actors responsible for administering the 
migration process (Favell and Hanson 2002).  
 
With the migration process broken up into a number of phases from the pre-migration 
stage through to integration in the destination country, we define migration 
intermediaries as agents that intervene at various critical junctures to connect the 
migrant to the destination country labour market. This paper segments intervention 
between the migrant and the intermediary into three distinct phases: from the pre-
migration stage through to post-settlement integration. Unlike Findlay and Li (1998) 
who see intermediary agencies as including intercompany transfer infrastructure, we 
focus on the self-initiated and self-funded agent-migrant relationship at the meso level 
of analysis. While so, we agree that all intermediaries “…. naturally interface with the 
barriers and obstacles of state immigration legislation as well as with the less tangible 
obstacles restricting entry to foreign labor and housing markets” (Findlay and Li 
1998, 683). This point clearly identifies the connections between the meso-level and 
other levels of analysis and, formal and informal and tangible and less tangible 
dimensions.  Elrick and Lewandowska (2008, 722) bring similar characteristics to 
light in their work which differentiates between agents who gain material rewards and 
intermediaries who receive non-financial rewards for services rendered in the process 
of facilitating migration. Similar to the work of Elrick and Lewandowska (2008) we 
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focus on the commercially-driven or financial exchange between the migrant and the 
agent, but we depart from them by using the terms agent and intermediary 
interchangeably to denote these market-based interests; and, our focus is on skilled 
rather than low-skilled migrants.  
 
Contextual similarities can be drawn with the work on labour market intermediaries 
(Coe. et. al. 2010; Forde, 2008; Gonos, 1997; Hoque et. al. 2011; McDowell et. al. 
2007), which highlights how intermediaries rely on political involvement to secure 
legitimisation. This legitimacy in effect allows these agents to sidestep the 
‘traditional’ mediators in the attraction, allocation and integration of, in this case: 
migrant workers. While lessons from this scholarship are useful in establishing a 
bridge between the context set by the transitions in governance structures and 
migration processes, it is important to note the limitations given that migration 
intermediaries represent a broader construct. For example, they mediate different 
aspects of the migration process, influencing and shaping the decision to migrate; they 
facilitate entry into the labour market and are responsible for integration. Coe et al.’s 
work (2010) captures the complexity of intermediaries, noting that in spite of 
incorporating a globally interconnected network of agents and stakeholders, 
intermediaries are territorially embedded within nationally-specific employment 
relations regimes and therefore bound by conventions, rules, laws and policies that are 
set within these boundaries. Accordingly, while it is true that we can draw particular 
generalisations of the marketisation of the migration process, it is also true that we 
cannot assume that migration intermediaries are a homogenous entity internationally 
and/or regionally (Coe et. al. 2010, 1058, 1065). 
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Our definition is also informed by the work of Agunias (2009, 2) who states that:  
“Intermediaries are key actors that facilitate, and sometimes drive, migration within 
and across borders. By providing information and extending critical services in many 
stages of migration and in places of origin, transit and destination, legitimate 
intermediaries build migrants’ capabilities and expand their range of choice.” We 
refine this definition by drawing on Salt and Stein’s work (1997), categorising 
intermediary relations/intervention into three key phases: phase one, includes 
mobilisation and attraction; phase two includes allocation and labour market 
navigation/entry; and, phase three involves allocation and integration. These three 
phases are not mutually exclusive but interdependent. 
 
This research argues that given their provision of information and support structures, 
migration intermediaries play an important role in facilitating the decision to migrate 
and integrating migrants into the destination country labour market (Harvey and 
Groutsis 2012; Salt and Stein 1997). As such, irrespective of the depth of their 
involvement in the migration process, migrants are dependent on their services 
(Findlay and Li 1998, 682) and beholden to their financial demands (Agunias 2009; 
Salt and Stein 1997).  
 
This research extends our understanding of the nature and implications of changed 
relations between skilled migrants and the network of intermediaries available to 
them. In tracing the state’s withdrawal of authority to these agencies, our paper 
highlights the escalation of meso-level commercially-driven arrangements that have 
come to work alongside macro-level institutional agents and micro-level kinship and 
friendship networks. By drawing on a broad suite of scholarship including, 
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governance and migration and, literature examining labour market intermediaries, the 
paper highlights the implications for the migrant given their variable purchasing 
power, in accessing adequate and timely information and assistance in the process of 
migration and labour market integration. Most particularly it highlights how migrants 
increasingly shoulder the ‘risks’ of international mobility.  
 
We begin by highlighting the shift from ‘direct’ government management to ‘arms 
length’ governance strategies of migration. We then critically evaluate how migration 
intermediaries have been located by turning attention to migration scholars. This is 
followed by empirical examples of migration intermediaries, which are categorised 
within the three phases outlined earlier (mobilisation and attraction; allocation and 
labour market navigation/entry; allocation and integration). These examples illustrate 
the changing connections between migration intermediaries and the migrants they 
serve. We conclude by identifying the importance of examining the contemporary 
transformation of migration intermediaries to further an understanding of the 
escalating risk factors for migrants and potential ways such risks can be minimised.  
 
Transitions from Government to Network Governance 
To explain transitions in migration intermediaries we draw on Rhodes’ on-going 
research (Rhodes 1997, 1998, 2003, 2007), identifying the shift in policy 
administration from government to network governance. Rhodes indicates that in 
spite of a diversity of political traditions and systems, there has been a global 
convergence away from direct government policy administration toward the 
management of public services by a network of agents, by-passing the state entirely or 
working in partnership with it.  While power to allocate resources (including labour to 
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large public infrastructure projects) was, in the past, the main preserve of government 
agencies, commercially-driven interests have increasingly assumed this responsibility 
(Wright 2012). Of Rhodes’ analysis, Mette Kjaer notes (2011, 102): “By pointing at 
the many simultaneous processes of ‘hollowing out’, Rhodes’ analyses demonstrated 
that the central state was losing steering capacity.”  
Ultimately, Rhodes states (2007,1251): “the history of governance during the 20th 
century appears as a shifting balance between government and governance.” As such 
the notion of an historical ‘turn’ invites us to consider the transformation toward, and 
the implications of, the ‘hollowing out’ of government and the concomitant 
emergence of a network of (commercially-driven) agents over time. Rhodes’ 
treatment captures the fluid context within which relational exchanges occur (between 
parties) and the temporal and dynamic nature of these relations, while also 
highlighting the shifting trends toward multiple agents (Rhodes 2007,1250). 
Accordingly, this approach allows us to examine, interpret and understand the 
experience of the client of particular services and their relationship with the network 
of service providers (Hyden et al 2004).   
While the governance scholarship has been influential in drawing our attention to the 
proliferation of multiple stakeholder arrangements it has not been without its critics 
(see for instance Mette Kjaer 2011; Bevir 2010). Some argue that Rhode’s work fails 
to engage with tools from social and political economy and so neglects “important 
aspects of interests, power and conflict” with consequences for understanding the 
risks involved in the governance dynamic (Mette Kjaer 2011,101; Davies 2005). 
These critics call for greater engagement with the structural inequalities that 
predetermine and frame the emergent dynamics and subsequent outcomes of network 
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governance structures in order to understand latent and direct conflict and power 
(Davies 2005; Fauser 2014). 
  
Relatedly, the assumed processes of rulemaking have also been questioned. The 
implicit assumption within much of the governance scholarship is that there is 
consensus within networks regarding the approach to setting and adhering to rules. 
Bevir et al (2003, 5) note that: “Rules are always open to interpretation. It is not just a 
question of literal meaning but also a question of to whom the rule applies and of how 
to apply the rule in any given situation …we must ask how beliefs, and so actions, are 
created, recreated and changed in ways that constantly reproduce and modify 
institutions.” This point brings to bear a key weakness in the governance scholarship. 
Notably, agents with the greatest resources (financial, human and social capital for 
instance) are placed in a position of power, and able to determine the rules and, in 
doing so pursue and consolidate their own interests (see also Bevir 2010). Such a 
position then, challenges the notion of consensus and/or a level playing field within 
and between stakeholders and particularly between the agents and those drawing on 
their services where the latter group are also differentiated by access to resources 
(particularly financial). Importantly, consideration of the notion of accountability, 
appeals and sanctions in response to the exploitation or misappropriation of rules is 
also relevant here (Erkkila 2007).  
 
There are various important implications of these weaknesses when related to the 
issue of migration and the complementary governance structures. For example de 
Haas (2010) is one of several migration scholars who implicitly captures the transition 
to network governance specifically within migration management and as such, draws 
attention to politico-economic and socio-structural factors. His research differentiates 
 
 
9 
macro-level institutional arrangements, organisations located at the meso level, along 
with kinship and friendship ties, located at the micro level (see also Boyd 1989; 
Findlay and Li 1998; Gurak and Cases 1992; Martin 2006; Elrick and Lewandowska 
2008; Massey et al 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Salt and Stein 1997).  This 
multi-scale analysis is important because the creation of new market actors at the 
global, national, regional, local and individual level not only affects migration trends 
but also influences power relationships within and between migrant groups and the 
agents with whom they undertake a transaction in the migration process.  
 
Taken together, such insights allow us to re-interpret the boundaries of the migration 
governance structure while simultaneously incorporating institutional and structural 
arrangements (macro level considerations) with organisational and individual 
motivations/actions (meso and micro level considerations). As advocated by Findlay 
and Li (1998, 701) we need to go beyond a single-level conceptualisation of migration 
management. By placing the meso-level of analysis (and the stakeholders located 
within it) at the centre of our investigation, this offers us a useful entry point as, “Such 
agencies link not only distant places around the globe, but also offer a middle ground 
linking individual human actions with the structuring influences of macro level 
sociopolitical and economic forces.” These conceptual cues provide important tools 
for explaining and understanding the significant changes shaping migration processes 
for skilled migrants and the implications of these developments for the migrants 
involved. 
 
Scaling migration intermediaries and the role of meso-level commercial 
intermediaries  
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A review of the main theories of migration illustrates the opportunities offered by 
migration theorists and the significant gaps in understanding migration intermediaries.  
A notable absence identified in the following overview is the meso-level of analysis 
and the stakeholders located in this sphere (Findlay and Li 1998; Elrick and 
Lewandowska 2008; Forde and Mackenzie 2011; Krissman 2005; Salt and Stein 
1997).  
In terms of macro-level research, the focus is largely on institutional arrangements, 
and includes investigations of relations between the sending and receiving countries, 
the rules that determine and facilitate this exchange and the way in which immigrant 
adjustment is satisfied (Lee 1966; Richmond and Zubrzycki 1984). While important 
in identifying the broad political and economic context of migration, the migrant’s 
organisational and industrial and/or occupational identity has often remained 
invisible, as have the relations between them and the mediators of the migration and 
adjustment process.  
At the other end of the spectrum, much of the micro-level analysis assumes that 
migrants transfer their individual human capital skills independently to host country 
labour markets in order to achieve higher financial returns than in the home country. 
Borjas (1991) notes that individuals rationally assess the relative costs and benefits of 
staying in their home country compared to gaining employment in a host country. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the migrant is driven by a utilitarian logic to labour 
mobility: moving unencumbered and unassisted from country to country. As 
McGovern (2007, 218) notes: “labour migrants are often described as the closest 
living embodiment of homo-economicus – that rational, self-seeking amoral agent.” 
In this context, labour is considered another factor of production, drawn on when 
demanded and often freely mobile.  
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Migrant behaviour and the activities of employers are thus reduced to a simple 
economic exchange, with little recognition of the ‘intervening’ support mechanisms 
shaping migration decisions and facilitating migration. That is, the power relationship 
between the agents of migration and the migrant is neglected.  As a result the 
complex, human and dynamic elements of the migration and post-settlement 
adjustment phase are obscured. As noted, the rise of non-state actors in a market 
context has gone relatively unchecked and requires us to place the spotlight on these 
emergent players in the process of migration and labour market integration (Pijpers 
2010).   
 
The push-pull factor analysis offered by migration theorists (Portes and Borocz 1989), 
that compare labour migration to the flow of capital and trade neglect the role of 
critical agents who sit at the intersection of the push and pull dynamic, simultaneously 
influencing potential migrants to leave one country and move to another, or ‘pulling’ 
potential migrants at one point in time but ‘pushing’ them at another point in time. 
Such fundamental relational exchanges between the migrant and key intermediary 
stakeholders as enablers of the migration process requires more detailed analysis as 
they have significant flow-on effects for migration and integration outcomes (Forde 
and Mackenzie 2011; Salt and Stein 1997). 
 
Migration network theorists go some way to identifying the processes within the 
structure of migration management. To this end, attention is turned to the significance 
of information exchanges and the institutional and social networks that shape 
migration processes (de Haas 2010; Elrick and Lewandowska 2008; Granovetter 
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1973, 1985; Massey et al 1998). For instance, Bauer and Zimmerman (1999,19) note 
that the process of information gathered through network ties is key to gaining access 
to the labour market, stating that such connections: “… lower the risks associated with 
migration to a foreign region, because individuals can expect help from previously 
migrated people to find a job in the destination country.” This point captures the 
relational and dynamic nature of migrant decision-making. While useful, the network 
scholars largely neglect meso level stakeholders, instead privileging the macro or 
micro level arrangements (Krissman 2005; Kuptsch 2006; Mackenzie and Forde 
2011; Sporton 2013). In spite of this, they draw our attention to the centrality of 
formal and informal information flows through network arrangements.  
In this vein, the work of Goss and Lindquist (1995, 351) helpfully shows how 
network connections inform the process of migration and integration where these 
connections hold (variable) value for the migrant and the network with which they 
connect (see also Elrick and Lewandowska 2008, 722). Extending on this, de Haas 
(2010, 1589-1590) notes the distinction between the networks themselves and the 
resources that can be mobilised through such networks (see also Elrick and 
Lewandowska 2008, 722). This is important in the context of intermediaries because 
while in principle the services of agents are equally available to all migrants, the 
transactional, commercial and discretionary nature of these networks in the assistance 
offered around employment, legal and housing services for instance, means that in 
reality particular groups of migrants are channeled into different sectors of the labour 
market as a result of the variable quality and range of services provided.  Driven by a 
business case approach to assistance in the process of migration and integration, 
migrants with fewer financial resources are disadvantaged by the transactional nature 
of the exchange between the migrant and the intermediary. This (unfairly) alters the 
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power dynamic implicit in the exchange between the migrant worker and the host 
country labour market. 
The nature of the (purchased) relationship and service between a migrant and an 
intermediary is a critical determinant of the success of the migration process and 
subsequent labour market integration. To illustrate, evidence drawn from OECD 
member states shows that skilled migrants who enter countries without ‘substantial’ 
information on the job entry or qualifications accreditation process experience greater 
difficulty entering the labour market in a position commensurate to their skills and 
qualifications.  And because such information is often either not publically available, 
or migrants do not know how to gain access to it, the role of the intermediary is 
critical in facilitating this process. As a result, those who do not use intermediaries are 
potentially: “unutilised, that is, they are either unemployed or not in the labour force” 
(Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009,17; see also Cerna 2010) an outcome which reinforces 
pre-existing structural inequalities.  
Research by Batalova et al (2008,1) notes the human capital loss as a result of the 
downward mobility experienced by skilled migrants in the US where: “More than 1.3 
million college-educated immigrants are unemployed or working in unskilled jobs 
such as dishwashers, security guards, and taxi drivers-representing one of every five 
highly skilled immigrants in the US labor force.” In addition to the loss of skills due 
to brain waste, attrition rates of skilled migrants who struggle to adjust to the host 
country also raises concerns (Finch et al 2009; Oishi 2012; McKinsey Global Institute 
2012; Wickramasekara 2003).  
 
Increasingly, commercial interests and therefore a financial exchange between the 
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migrant and origin and destination-country agents have come to play an important 
role in shaping the migration process as well as the pattern and implications of skilled 
migration more broadly (Coe et. al. 2010; Mahroum 2000). This conclusion reflects 
the view that “it is almost impossible to speak of migration management, or migration 
at all, without also speaking of the migration industry” (Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Nyberg Sorensen 2006, 3; see also, Castles 2007; Elrick and Lewandowska 2008, 723 
- 724). As such, an investigation examining the defining characteristics of this 
emergent industry and, particularly the mediators who facilitate the migration and 
post-settlement process, remains central to understanding the experience of skilled 
migrant workers today (van Hear et al 2012). 
 
The Three Phases of Relations between Migration Intermediaries and Skilled 
Migrants  
The marketisation of migration and the rise of the migration intermediary as a key 
player in this market-driven context, has both positive and negative implications, 
which are reflected in our examination of intermediary relations in the three phases of 
migration: with phase one incorporating mobilisation and attraction; phase two, 
allocation and labour market navigation/entry; and, phase three, allocation and 
integration (Iredale 2000; KPMG 2011; Wright 2012).  While commercial interests 
have played a role in the management of migration throughout the Post World War II 
period, their proliferation and centrality in the mobilisation, allocation and integration 
of skilled migrants has been a more recent phenomenon.  
 
Since the 1950s and up to and including the present, skilled migrants have relied on a 
variety of different agents to enable and facilitate the process of migration. In the 
immediate post-war period, agencies such as the Inter-governmental Committee for 
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European Migration (ICEM, now known as the International Organisation for 
Migration [IOM]) undertook most aspects of the migration facilitation process. Marks 
(1957, 487) captures the extensive roles and responsibilities of the ICEM:  
“A key factor in successful resettlement is the interchange of accurate 
information between the sending and receiving countries. ICEM has made 
interpretive films and film strips of Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, which 
are sent to the countries receiving migrants from those nations. Written 
materials describing the countries of emigration are also available. 
Conversely, prospective migrants require reliable background and facts so 
they have no illusions about the countries to which they are proceeding. 
Information on the people, labour conditions, social legislation, and the like, 
in the receiving countries, are available to emigrants in booklets in their 
native tongues. Supplementary film showings and lectures are frequently 
arranged. Further, language and orientation courses are offered to migrants 
before their embarkation, and are continued on board ICEM- chartered 
ships.” 
 
Intergovernmental organisations such as the ICEM demanded negligible costs and 
were relatively inclusive, focusing on the prospect of capacity building both for 
migrants and receiving countries. Such supranational agencies, many of which still 
operate today, have been guided by and are responsive to universally sanctioned rules 
and conventions, with structured, transparent, publically accountable, and 
institutionally framed migration management processes. These agencies have also 
been guided by and have gone on to inform the supply-driven approach to migration, 
which was largely the trend up until the late 1980s when a market-driven approach to 
migration began to dominate (KPMG 2011; Wright 2012). The latter approach has 
spawned a greater emphasis on labour demand, particularly of skilled workers, as a 
key determinant of migration and thereby has consolidated the importance of multiple 
stakeholders in the attraction, allocation and integration of migrant labour.  
 
Internationally, migration patterns have moved away from a focus on family reunion 
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to a focus on skill and, an employer-driven approach to filling shortages with 
imported labour (OECD 2011; Papademitriou and Sumption 2011). For instance, 
Australia’s skill visa stream now accounts for almost 70% of the total migrant intake 
(DIAC 2012a). The international preoccupation with skill demands is captured in a 
large-scale data survey conducted annually by ManpowerGroup, in which employers 
have emphasised their strong (and unmet) demand for skilled employees 
(ManpowerGroup, 2013). To service the growing demand for workers, (particularly 
skilled), migration pathways have become more flexible (Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009). 
For instance, in Australia there has been an increase in non-permanent and onshore 
migration; the introduction of State Specific and Regional Migration Schemes; 
Enterprise Migration Agreements, and; increased settlement outside main gateways. 
Currently 5% of Australia’s total population are classified as temporary residents 
(Mares 2012). Similarly many states are introducing visas that target ‘high rollers’ or 
significant investors to attract foreign capital for business and infrastructure projects 
for instance (DIBP 2014). 
 
The urgency to match migrant workers to jobs efficiently has generated a significant 
opportunity for migration intermediaries who have keenly capitalised on the market 
generated by such mobility. Certainly these commercially-driven agents are linked to 
and influenced by the actions and policies of macro-level institutions and may also be 
informed by the activities of migrant groups at the micro level. Notwithstanding the 
importance of these connections, the focus here is to provide an analysis of a small 
sample of important intermediaries who have emerged in the context of market 
liberalisation through identifying their intervention in three key phases. 
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Phase one: Mobilisation and Attraction  
Located in both origin and destination countries, migration agents have become a 
critical source of information, connecting prospective migrants to jobs, accreditation 
authorities, educational institutions, housing and also assisting them with visa 
documents (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2010). While these agents may operate 
independently, there is an increasing presence of such service providers located within 
large multi-national professional service firms, such as Ernst and Young and Deloitte, 
explicitly linking the mobilisation and allocation process (phase one) to the allocation 
and labour market entry process (phase two). Services are used both in-house where 
there is a demand for managers or accountants with particular technical skills; or, the 
services of the migration agent are out-sourced to facilitate the attraction and 
deployment of skilled workers for clients. 
 
In the UK there has been a five-fold increase in registered migration agencies in the 
decade from 2004–2014 (OISC 2014, 20).  Similarly there has also been a steady 
growth in the number of migration agents in Australia (Australian Government 2014). 
In March 2014, there were approximately five thousand registered migration agents 
operating nationally; and this is complemented with a sizeable but unknown number 
of unregistered agents (Australian Government 2014, 4). Of those registered, 93% 
indicated as operating for commercial ends (Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship 2012; Australian Government 2014), highlighting that the majority of 
these services requires a financial outlay from the migrant.  Evidently, the costs and 
service quality are variable as notable by a search of 100 websites detailing such 
information (July – September, 2014, Australian Government Office of Migration 
Agents Registration Authority 2014; American Migration Agent Reviews 2014). It is 
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safe to conclude then that the migrant’s access to quality and efficient service is 
directly dependent on available financial resources. The use of services offered by 
migration agents is captured in studies by Hardill and MacDonald (2000) and Buchan 
et. al. (2005) who examine the relationship between migration agents and nurses in 
the process of migration. Both studies reveal the financial outlay made by the nurse 
for information on the qualifications accreditation process, employment information, 
visa assistance, transport and post-settlement accommodation. In short, the evidence 
they present builds a compelling case indicating that those with ready and available 
financial capital gain access to information while those with fewer resources are left 
vulnerable in a foreign system which is serviced by largely unmonitored agencies and 
a lack of enforced base levels of training for the service providers  (Hakak and Al 
Ariss 2013). 
 
Phase 2: Allocation and Labour Market Entry/Navigation  
Recruitment agents have played a significant role in linking migrants to employment 
throughout the history of migration (Elrick and Lewandowska 2008). Over the course 
of the last three decades this industry has expanded significantly and has come to play 
an important role in the facilitation of sourcing skilled workers (nationally and 
internationally) to satisfy the demands of the host country labour market (Coe. et. al. 
2010; Forde, 2008; Forde and Mackenzie 2011; Gonos, 1997; Hoque et. al. 2011; 
McDowell et. al. 2007). While variable codes of conduct regulate both recruitment 
and migration agents, monitoring is ad hoc (Forde, 2008; Forde and Mackenzie, 2011; 
Castles and Miller, 2009). The following examines the implications of this growing 
migration intermediary for migrant workers.  
In 1997 the ILO estimated that approximately 80 percent of the temporary movement 
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of migrants from Asia to the Arab states was mediated by private recruitment 
agencies (Demaret ILO 2006 in Agunias 2012, 2; see also Newland 2013, 8). Agunias 
notes that in spite of the lack of up-to-date and comparable estimates, it is safe to 
assume that, “private agencies continue to account for the vast majority of contract 
labour migration flows to the region” (Agunias 2012, 2; see also Rahman 2011; van 
Hear et al 2012; Ward et al 2001). As brokers between the migrant and the destination 
labour market, evidence shows they have both positive and negative implications for 
the migrant drawing on their services which largely revolve around financial and non-
financial costs founded on what is described as a minimal compliance/business case 
model of service delivery (Agunias 2012, 9; Forde and Mackenzie 2011).  
For instance, Agunias (2013) notes that in areas of high demand the cost of using an 
employment agency is devolved to the employer. To illustrate, the health sector 
provides a useful case in point, where “a survey of nurse recruiters in the United 
States found that a substantial majority (82 percent) do not charge migrant nurses an 
up-front fee” (2013, 6). However, concerns are brought to light in our examination of 
particular groups of migrant nurses where, an ethnic penalty is imposed by the 
recruitment agent. Forde and Mackenzie (2011, 33) note that a business case logic to 
employment agency operations has served to consolidate race, gender and class 
divisions and therefore labour market segmentation along these lines, a point which is 
illustrated in the following example drawing on migrant nurses.  
Newland (2013, 9) argues that in spite of the implementation of agreements 
established to monitor employment agents, “… the bilateral agreement between the 
government of the United Kingdom and the Philippines resulted in only 200 nurses 
recruited into the UK National Health Service; while private medical facilities, which 
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were not covered by the agreement, recruited 2,000 Filipino nurses in the same 
period” (see also Buchan 2001; Buchan et al  2005). While the market mechanism can 
act in the interests of many skilled migrants, particularly in areas of high demand, it 
can also result in a pecking order of attraction and therefore segmentation based on 
ethnicity for instance, emphasising that dependence on commercially-driven 
intermediaries may result in a reinforcement and reproduction of structural 
inequalities.  
For skilled migrants who seek access to the destination labour market but do not hold 
the relevant (commensurate) credentials, educational institutions have also become 
important agents in facilitating labour market entry through the provision of for 
instance: language classes, bridging courses for accreditation purposes and degree and 
diploma courses (Hawthorne, 2008). While educational institutions offer opportunities 
for re-accreditation and therefore access to the destination labour market in a position 
that reflects skills and qualifications, access often comes at substantial cost, both in 
terms of the educational product purchased and in terms of time out from active 
labour force participation. This places the burden of risk of migrating; and, gaining 
access to and integrating into the destination labour market in the hands of the migrant 
while also creating inequitable access given the importance placed on financial 
capital.  
 
Phase 3: Allocation and Integration  
As an important non-state agent, the transforming migration context has placed 
employers in a significant position, in the attraction, allocation and integration of 
skilled migrants globally (The Independent, 2013; Mares 2012; OECD 2012). Unlike 
supply-driven migration based on the points system, where the state determines 
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criteria against which skilled migrants can apply to enter a country, the demand-
driven (and often relatedly, temporary) migration process relies explicitly on market 
indicators to determine to whom and how labour market access is granted. Noting the 
shift away from supply-driven to employer-driven migration in the United States, 
Papademetriou and Sumption (2011,1) argue that this approach goes some way to 
respond to the underutilisation of skills as a result of difficulties in qualifications 
accreditation and/or integrating into the host country labour market. The 
organisational context has therefore become central to the integration of skilled 
migrants.   
Alternatively, the migrant’s dependence on the employer for their continued legal and 
legitimate employment status raises concerns, founded on the unequal power dynamic 
between the sponsor (employer) and migrant (Elrick and Lewandowska 2008; Wright 
2012).  Furthermore, over time a bloated imported labour reserve may in fact place 
downward pressure on local wages increasing tensions between local and imported 
labour while also creating artificial segments in the labour market with migrants 
channeled into less desirable and less financially rewarding areas (Batalova et. al. 
2008; Reitz 2005).  
The three phases presented and the illustrative examples for each phase highlight a 
significant degree of overlap between these categories. What is clear is that the 
intermediaries shape and impact on the migration and labour market integration 
process in various (and intersecting) ways. Over the last two to three decades 
migration management has moved to a largely fee-driven exchange between migrant 
and intermediary, granting the intermediary discretionary powers in what is a largely 
market-driven and often weakly regulated migration process. Given that migration 
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intermediaries charge a range of fees for their services, access to and the quality of 
intermediary networks, is increasingly determined by the financial capital resources of 
skilled migrants (van Hear 2004). As a corollary, the greater the breadth and depth of 
the relationship forged and the resources used in this process by the migrant, the 
weaker the financial and non-financial risks in the migration process, which can 
include: loan repayments to the intermediary, downward mobility, an inability to gain 
skills and qualifications accreditation, and an inability to integrate in the host country 
labour market (Jayati 2009; OECD 2012). 
 
Conclusion  
As in many other areas of the economy, market liberalisation and a disarticulation of 
state interventions (Favell and Hanson 2002; Fauser 2014) have created market 
opportunities for new actors in the process of global mobility. Drawing on the shift 
from government to network governance, the paper demonstrates that while skilled 
migrants still rely on friendship/kinship ties (micro level arrangements) or 
institutional directions (macro level arrangements) to facilitate migration, there has 
been an increasing reliance on a fast developing migration industry (Castles 2007; 
Elrick and Lewandowska 2008).  This means that reliable intermediary services may 
often be restricted to migrants who have considerable financial resources, while those 
with more limited resources take what they can get (Elrick and Lewandowska 2008; 
Pijpers 2010).   
 
This increasingly transactional exchange between the migrant and intermediary 
recasts, greater responsibility (and arguably power and control) in the hands of 
variably regulated intermediary actors who offer variable services in terms of quality. 
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Second, while migrant choice and motivation based on career advancement or 
citizenship, play an important role in intermediary engagement (Findlay and Li, 
1998), greater focus on the potential purchasing capacity and migrant access to 
quality information is also important (van Hear 2004). In short, labour market and 
settlement outcomes are increasingly influenced by the relationship ‘purchased’ with 
agents, placing the risk of migration firmly in the hands of the migrant. Third, access 
and equity issues mean that some groups of migrants are excluded from access to 
information and as such experience downward mobility, which reinforces structural 
inequities. Future research could further investigate the changing transactional 
exchanges between the migrant and the intermediary by examining each of the 
intermediaries and their relationship with particular groups of migrants in different 
geographic and sectoral contexts.  
 
As discussed above, the three phases of intermediary intervention are not mutually 
exclusive and intermediaries may well be located within more than one phase of the 
migration/labour market allocation and integration categories presented, particularly 
as some intermediaries become a ‘one-stop’ shop style provider of migration services  
(Forde 2008). While so, relations and interaction between these agents within the 
various phases occurs on an ad-hoc basis making the process of gaining information 
from a suite of agents more difficult to achieve for migrants. Future research could 
also examine exactly how these agents operate and the implications of a disjointed 
collaboration between the various intermediaries for the migrants seeking an efficient 
transition into the destination country.  
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Notably, the relationship struck between the migrant and the intermediary is not only 
held together by the potential of a financial gain for the information and assistance 
offered but also by different conventions (formal: legal and policy; and informal: 
cultural context and customs), which remain a largely unexplored facet of the 
migration exchange process (Elrick and Lewandowska 2008). These conventions 
provide legitimacy to the information offered; set the expectations between the 
various stakeholders involved in the exchange; and depending on the foundations of 
exchange as driven by the convention, may go on to perpetuate the process of 
exchange over time. Such conventions also inform the process of decision-making 
(which determines the accepted exchange relations between migrant and 
intermediary) and consolidate the power dynamics between the migrant and the 
intermediary.  Importantly, such conventions are loosely based on policy direction 
from the state but are not governed by legally enforced restrictions and (potential) 
sanctions (Harvey and Groutsis 2012; Forde and Mackenzie 2011). Therefore, an 
understanding of conventions forged in the market domain is of paramount 
importance. Presently, one could question how these new agents could be more 
closely monitored, and regulated. Future research would need to examine the 
monitoring process and the effect of the power dynamics between intermediaries and 
different groups of skilled migrants, to make more transparent what is often a very 
opaque and poorly analysed aspect of the migration process.   
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